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An error was made when coapiling VolUJle Ro. 23. 
PLEASE :READ ·eomaent•. Page 26 & 27. in conjunction 
with the Strachen Case. Page 2 - 6. 
... 1 -
CORRECTION 
On page 20 of Volume 22 of this publiGation, the names of the ~ccu~e<f. 
are misspelled, The correct na111e is Rodenbush and not R.osenbusq. 
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.. - 2 -
CHARTER - RIGHT TO.COUNS~L· - EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Regina v. Strachen, B. C. Court of Appeal, Vancouver CA003192, January 
1986.. ' 
Four police· officers executed a search warrant for the accused's 
apartment • . The accused was served with a copy of the warrant and very 
shortly thereafter placed under arrest for possession of marihuana. 
The accused had said: "I'm going to call my lawyer". He was stopped 
from doing so by the officers and was promised to be given an oppor-
tunity to phone when "matters are under control". Police had 
explained at trial that the accused was the registered owner of 
restricted weapons and they suspected that other persons were in the 
apartment. The search (which resulted in the seizure of marihuana, 
scales, plastic baggies, and a huge number of bills, lasted 90 
minutes. The accused was taken to the police station and was there 
given an opportunity to phone his lawyer. 
Although there was no causal connection between the infringement of 
the accused's right to counsel without delay and the finding of the 
marihuana and the paraphernalia, the trial judge had disallowed the 
finding of the narcotic into evidence. He held there was a flagrant 
denial of a right and allowing the evidence in these circumstances 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. An acquit-
tal followed and the Crown appealed. 
Before the B. C. Court of Appeal the Crown argued that the exclusion 
of the evidence was an error on the· part of the trial judge. There 
simply was no connection between the infringement of the accused 1 s 
right and the finding of the evidence. After all, s. 24 ( 2) of · the 
Charter states that consideration for exclusion only comes into play 
when "... a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner 
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this 
Charter ...... 
Defence counsel argued that the Supreme Court of Canada had made it 
clear in their reasons for judgement in the Therens* case that where 
the infringement is under s. lO(b) of the Charter (to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right) the 
exclusion is automatic whether or not there is the "causal link" 
between the infringement and the obtaining of the evidence. 
The B. c. Court of Appeal (which already responded to the Therens 
decision in two previous cases**) did, in . this case, an elaborate 
* Regina v. Therens, 18 c.c.c. (3d) 481. Page 1, Volume 21 of this 
publication. 
** See the Rodenbush and Rodenbush and Gladstone cases on page 20 of 
Volume 22 of this publication. 
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explanation of its views of the exclusionary rule and the trend it 
appears to take in Canadian cases . 
The Therens decision does settle a number of important issues: 
1. Someone under demand to give samples of breath, is "detained"; 
2. S. 24( 2) of the Charter is the only source of power for the 
judiciary to exclude evidence; 
3. S. 235 of the Criminal Code is not "a limit prescribed by law" 
that allows an infringement of a Charter right (s. 1 of the 
Charter states that the rights and freedoms in the Charter are 
guaranteed "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law ..• "). 
Some say that the Therens decision created a strict exclusionary rule, 
whether or not there is a causal connection between the infringement 
of a right and the obtaining of the evidence considered for exclusion 
if the infringement is one under the · "right to counsel" provision in 
the Charter (S. lO(b) Charter). Others go even further and claim that 
the Therens case justifies exclusion of evidence against an accused 
regardless which right or freedom had been infringed. There are more 
theories floating around yet, but these will do to understand what the 
B. C. Court of Appeal was addressing. 
Long before the Therens case, the B. c. Court of Appeal had addressed 
itself to the exclusionary rule*. Although they have now modified 
their views slightly, it seems to insist that those cases in principle 
have survived the Therens decision. 
In any event the Court of Appeal responded to a number of questions 
about s. 24(2) of the Charter: 
1. In what circumstances can it apply? 
2. Where can it apply; how is it to be applied? 
They found that Therens decision, in respect to the exclusionary rule, 
had caused "perplexity and difficulty" on account of the widespread 
opinions of the justices who authorized or joined in various reasons 
for judgement. 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the Therens case was not an appro-
priate one to compare with this Strachan. case, although in both there 
was a failure to comply with the "right to counsel" clause in 
* Collins, Cohen and Hamill cases - see Volumes 12 and 17 of this 
publication. 
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the Charter. Therens was by statute obliged to provide evidence 
within the time limits set by section 235 of the Criminal Code. 
Strachan was under no obligation to do anything. Therefore the Court 
of Appeal held there was a distinction between the application of s. 
24(2) of the Charter in cases with a "special nature of the evidence" 
and those involving "ordinary evidence". 
The Court concluded that the Therens decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada had therefore "no conclusive bearing on the issues in this 
case". 
In respect to the Crown's argument that there was no causal connection 
between the obtaining of the evidence and the infringement of 
Strachan's right, the B. c. Court of Appeal agreed with defence 
counsel that the relationship between the obtaining of the evidence 
and the infringement need not be one of causation. In other words it 
need not be a matter· of "cause and effect" before the evidence may be 
considered for exclusion. However, if there is no such connection 
between the infringement and the obtaining of the evidence, "it will 
generally not be possible to find that the admission of the evidence 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute". The 
"manner" by which the evidence is obtained (language of s. 24(2) 
Charter) need not be the very act that amounts to the infringement or 
the very means by which the evidence was obtained. In this case, the 
Court observed, the denial by the officers to allow Strachan to use 
the telephone, had no causal connection to what the search produced. 
Had he been allowed the call to his lawyer the search would have been 
conducted regardless of what the lawyer would have advised Strachan. 
There was a violation of the accused's right and despite the fact that 
it had no causal connection with the finding of the evidence, it trig-
gered consideration · for. the exclusion of the evidence found by the 
search. The main consideration of course, would be in regards to the 
admission of the evidence bringing the administration of justice into 
disrepute. Firstly the Court held that the violation "was towards the 
less serious end of the scale". Secondly the B. C. Court of Appeal 
held that if evidence was obtained in connection with an infringement 
of an accused's right, then admission of that evidence does not mean 
that the Court condones or approves of the rights violation. The sole 
consideration must be the disrepute this admission may bring upon the 
administration of justice. Therefore the notion of condonation would 
bring automatic exclusion "and render meaningless the qualifying words 
in s. 24(2)" of the Charter. In this case the counsel for the defence 
argued that there had been an infringement and therefore exclusion 
must follow. That view the B. C. Court of Appeal rejected. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal then gave, again, their opinion on the mean-
ing of our exclusionary rule. It had already reasoned that the 
decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Therens did not create an 
automatic or strict exclusionary rule. In this case it seemed to take 
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issue with its counterpart in Ontario which decided in 1985* that a 
Mr. Duguay had been arbitrarily detained and that evidence against him 
should therefore be excluded. The B. C. Court of Appeal said that the 
Duguay decision went a long way towards automatic exclusion. The 
B.C. Court disagreed with their Ontario brothers and saw what is 
happening in Canada as a "dichotomy" on the issue of the exclusionary 
rule. It left no doubt where it stood on the matter. The B.C. Court 
of Appeal summed up that many see the exclusionary rule as a means to 
recompense an accused for the violation of his right; to deter police 
from further breaches; to deprive the police of the fruits of their 
victory; to even up an uneven contest; to indirectly acquit ·a "viola-
ted" accused to vindicate him or her; etc.. If that is the view that 
will . gain the upperhand in the current dispute over the exclusionary 
rule, the Charter, as well as the administration of justice will be 
brought into disrepute concluded the court. 
The Court reminded that the general public is firmly of the belief 
that the Charter only protects those who violate the rights and 
dignity of others; that police unavoidably will be persuaded ·to "live 
down" to its new reputation resulting from constant denigration 
brought about by Charter arguments. It seems the B. C. Court of 
Appeal warns that eventually the justice system will cripple itself to 
the extent that it can no longer function as it is intended to. This, 
of course, if the system insists on an automatic and strict exclusion-
ary rule. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal used the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in 
Duguay as an example to demonstrate that a strict exclusionary rule is 
overkill and fails to be remedial. 
Duguay had been fingerprinted while he was "arbitrarily" detained. 
The fingerprint evidence which proved him to be the perpetrator of the 
crime alleged against him was excluded "automatically". The Ontario 
Justices had taken guidance from an American case** in which a Mr. 
Davis, who was a black youth, had allegedly raped an 86 year old white 
woman. His fingerprints connected him with the crime but the evidence 
was excluded. He and his young friends had been unlawfully detained 
when the prints had been taken. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal questioned the remedial applicability of 
following the Mississippi case or any of the other U.S. cases which 
preceded it in the twenties and thirties. In 1985, what did the 
Ontario citizen Mr. Duguay have, in terms of sociological and justice 
perspectives, in common with his black fellow men in the deep south 
some decades ago. Lynching approaches, . brutality, vigilante tactics 
and the like were used against the black citizens at that time and the 
Courts had a duty to use the U.S. constitution to remedy those intol-
lerable practices. The fact that the accused was identified as 
"black" in the trial judge's reasons for judgement and the victim 
* R. v. Duguay 45 C.R. (3d) 140 
** Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 720 (1969) 
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as "white", was more than a Freudian slip thought the B. C. Court of 
Appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court had said it would exclude the finger-
print evidence to clearly indicate that the police misconduct against 
the black citizens would no longer be tollerated. In other words, 
there was something · quite serious to be remedied in Mississippi in 
1969. What, in comparison, needed to be remedied in Ontario in 1985 
to justify the same extreme measure? Where, in Mississippi a mountain 
lion needed to be destroyed, we in Ontario only had need to get rid of 
a bothersome mosquito. A shotgun was used in the deep south; there-
fore was the same type of weapon justified for the Ontario hunt, our 
B. C. Court of Appeal seems to wonder. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal also reviewed a number of other U.S. cases 
including the famous Miranda ruling by the U. S. Supreme Court. The 
B. c. Court of Appeal concluded that in view of the distinction in 
Constitutions and sociological problems, applying the U. S. exclusion-
ary rule in Canada 
• • • would be akin to administering chemotherapy to a 
patient who complains of a lingering cold It may do 
nothing for the cold but is bound to make him sick enough 
that he will no longer care". 
Furthermore, in respect to a need for our exclusionary rule being 
strict and automatic, the Court said: 
"Another fundamental difference between our situation and 
that of the U.S. is that the Charter, by language of s. 
24(2) clearly intends that each case will be considered in 
relation to its particular circumstances. It does not 
require the adoption of the clumsy and draconian device of 
an automatic exclusionary rule ...... 
If we continue the current trend towards such a rule, the Court 
warned, we will end up with "a rigid and unbalanced situation". 
Get ting back to Mr. Strachan and his appeal, who claimed that his 
rights had been violated and that, consequently, the search police 
conducted of his home was unlawful, the B. C. Court of Appeal held 
that the search was lawful. 
Crown's appeal allowed . 
Acquittal set aside. 
New trial ordered . 
* * * * * 
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EFFECTING AN ARREST IN A HOME 
- WARRANTS - TRESPASS 
The Queen and Landry, Supreme Court of Canada, February 1986 
A citizen saw the accused and a companion attempting to steal a car . 
He phoned police, gave them the description of the duo and pointed out 
an apartment building they had entered. The men lived in the apart-
ment block and police spotted them through a window. Police entered 
the apartment and effected an arrest for the attempt to steal the 
car. The accused Landry had put up a fight and was charged with 
assaulting a peace officer. The main issue during the ensuing trial 
was whether the assaulted officer was in the lawful performance of his 
duty. 
The accused was acquitted at trial. This verdict was upheld by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal* and the Crown took their arguments to the 
Supreme Court of Canada which took nearly a year to render reasons for 
judgement. 
The legal propriety of arresting a person in a dwelling house and the 
matter of trespass to effect the arrest are not new questions to law. 
Perhaps, before dealing with the reasons for judgement in this Landry 
case, it may be of assistance to briefly review the legal history of 
this issue. 
The matter of an authority entering a home against the wishes of the 
dweller had already been dealt with by the author of the Bible book 
Deuteronomy (24: 10). It was also recognized as a dictum in law in 
1604 in the historical Semayne's case** when the English courts held: 
"The house of everyone is to him as his 
fortress, as well for his defence against 
violence, as for his repose ..... 
castle and 
injury and 
Our Courts have interpreted this dictum and applied it in many differ-
ent situations and scenarios. In 1974 our Supreme Court of Canada 
considered an appeal where police in B.C. forced their way into a 
dwelling to arrest a person who they had reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe was harboured in that house. Quebec warrants were 
outstanding for him. 
The occupant of the house sued police for trespass and the Supreme 
* R. v. Landry, Volume 8, page 22 of this publication 
** 5 Co. Rep. 19a 77 E.R. 194 
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Court of Canada* said about this "castle" and "fortress": 
"But there are occasions when the interest of a private 
individual in the security of his house must yield to the 
public interest in the process to be executed. The 
criminal is not immune from arrest in his own home nor in 
the home of his friends". 
The Supreme Court of Canada in that case also reiterated that forced 
entry by police is only justified if done by judicial licence 
(warrants), when in fresh pursuit of a person they have the authority 
to arrest, or for the purpose of saving someone from death or injury. 
In certain cases, prevention of the destruction of evidence can justi-
fy forced entry. Although circumstances in respect to urgency may 
alter these prerequisites to a forced entry, the officer is compelled 
to firstly knock or ring the doorbell, then identify him or herself, 
and state the lawful reason for entry. 
In. 1983, the County Court of Kootenay applied this Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in a case** where a police officer was assaulted when 
he attempted to effect, in a home, the arrest of a man who two hours 
previously had attacked a woman and had threatened her with a knife. 
The occupants of the house were the man's friends and none of the 
requisite conditions summed up above existed. The officer did not 
have a warrant for the arrest of the man. This made the case distinct 
in circumstances from Eccles v. Bourque. Hence the Court held that 
the officer was not in the lawful performance of his duty and the 
accused were acquitted. Needless to say that this is not the only 
case that gave this interpretation to the Supreme Court of Canada's 
1974 judgement. This case is simply a good example of how the Supreme 
Court of Canada's decision was interpreted and applied. 
Now the very question of law raised in that Kootenay case has been put 
to the Supreme Court of Canada in this Landry case where two would-be 
thieves had simply gone home and police became aware of their wherea-
bouts from information given by a citizen and from personal observa-
tion. Police did not have a judicial licence of any kind but relied 
totally on the provisions of s. 450 of the Criminal Code in that they 
had reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the accused had 
committed an indictable offence. The sole question was whether the 
officer when assaulted by Landry, (when he . (the officer) entered the 
home) was in the lawful performance of his duty. 
All nine justices of our nation's supreme court considered this matter 
and three concurring and one dissenting judgements resulted. The 
* Eccles v. Bourque, 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (1974). Also see Volume 8, 
page 23 of this publication. 
** R. v. Fiddler, Fiddler and King, Volume 15, page _24 of this 
publication. 
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Court said (8 to 1) that a police officer in circumstances as these is 
authorized to enter a home to effect an arrest without warrant. It, 
in essence, said: " ••• a police officer can make an arrest on private 
premises without a warrant in the execution of his duty for the 
purposes of s. 450(1)(a) C.C.". The common law is clear and compel-
ling said the Court: 
there should be no place which gives an offender 
sanctuary from arrest" . 
The Court did not make a distinction between an arrest with a warrant 
or without a ·warrant in these circumstances. Consequently, it 
concluded that since there is no provision for a warrant to search for 
a person, a fugitive could find complete and permanent protection from 
the law in a private home. This, the Court held was unacceptable and 
it ruled that the officer who was assaulted by Landry was in the 
lawful performance of his duty. 
The Court reasoned that if it would hold that a warrant for arrest 
should firstly be obtained ••• "valuable time and probably the offender, 
will be lost. 
To reach the conclusion it did, the Court answered all of the follow-
ing questions with "Yes": 
1. Was the offence for which the officer attempted to effect the 
arrest, an indictable offence?; 
2. (a) Had the person they wanted to arrest committed the offence; 
or (b) did the police have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that that person had committed or was about to commit the 
indictable offence?; 
3. Did police have reasonable and probable grounds for believing 
that the person they were authorized to arrest was in the 
premises?; and 
4. Was proper announcements made before entry? 
Crown's Appeal Allowed . 
Acquittal set aside . 
New trial ordered. 
Comment: The Supreme Court of Canada can reverse its own previous 
rulings. In view of the interpretation all Courts have given to 
the (1974) judgement in Eccles v. Bourque one is inclined to believe 
that that is what the Supreme Court of Canada did. However, something 
dispells that notion . The B. C. Court of Appeal, when it dealt with 
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the Eccles v. Bourque case, held that the Quebec warrants outstanding 
for the . person Mr. Eccles was supposed to be harboring, were not 
endorsed by a B. C. Judge. Therefore the officers were, in essence, 
effecting an arrest without a warrant and did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds for believing that there wiS"""" a warrant in force 
within the territorial jurisdiction in which the person they attempted 
to arrest was found (s. 450(1)(c) C.C.). Due to their knowledge of 
the warrants and their content they were authorized to arrest as it 
gave the officers reasonable and probable grounds to believe the man 
had committed an indictable offence. The Supreme Court of . Canada 
(which found for the officers in that civil dispute) claims now that 
it did agree with the B. C. Court of Appeal that there were no valid 
warrants to be executed in B. C. The Supreme Court of Canada implies 
that it said then what it is saying now, that the arrest without a 
warrant on grounds as explained above, is within the lawful perfor-
mance of a peace officer's duty. In other words all the requirements 
for an entry in a private home as they are summed up in this case are 
a reiteration of what the Court said in 1974. The Court expressed 
surprise that the "Courts below", had given their Eccles judgement the 
interpretation that a warrant to arrest has anything to do with 
entering private premises. Said the Court: 
"I am unable, in any event, to fathom how a warrant for 
arrest can be perceived as a solution to the question of 
police authority to trespass incidental to arrest. The 
warrant is a judicial authorization to arrest and contains 
no express power to trespass. • ••• There is no good 
reason therefore, why the presence or absence of a warrant 
of arrest should have any bearing on the right to make an 
arrest in one particular place or another". 
* * * * * 
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ATTEMPTED BREAK AND ENTER WITH INTENT TO COMMIT INDICTABLE OFFENCE 
ERRONEOUS FINDING OF FACTS - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
Schuldt and The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, December 1985 (17810) 
A silent .alarm alerted police in early morning hours, that something 
was amiss .at a gun shop. When two patrol cars arrived at the back of 
the shop two men were seen running away in opposite directions. The 
one ·carrying a · tire iron was never found but an iron matching the 
marks and paint of the shop door (which had not given way to the 
prying) was located along the path the fugitive was seen to have 
taken. The other man who ran ·from the back door was the accused. 
Besides having been positively identified, his shoes matched • the 
prints in the snow at the door. Upon arrest the accused · made "only 
one statement of any consequence" which was admitted in evidence at 
his trial. When he asked for the use of the phone, the accused 
explained he wanted to phone home. The officers inquired if he wanted 
to phone his brother perhaps. The accused had replied: "He's a faster 
runner". 
The trial judge acquitted the accused and the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial. The accused appealed 
this Court of Appeal decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The trial and appeal process revealed some interesting aspects about a 
case like this. Some of the legal hurdles to be overcome by the Crown 
when it alleges "attempt" are as follows: 
1. It must be proved that the evidence relied on proves more than 
mere preparation to commit the attempted indictable offence; 
2. The evidence must show that the accused had directly forced the 
door or was a party to the offence according to s. 21 C.C.; 
3. That what was done to the door was done with the intent to break 
and enter into the gun shop; and 
4. That he intended to commit an indictable offence once inside . 
Section 306( 2) (a) C .c. states that it may be presumed that a person 
who has broken and entered a place, had, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, intent to commit an indictable offence while inside. 
Needless to say that this presumption was of no assistance to the 
Crown in this case. It has to prove without the assistance of any 
presumption that the accused was a party to the tampering with the 
door, that the tampering was an attempt to gain entry, and that the 
accused intended to commit an indictable offence once inside. The 
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trial judge concluded that the Crown had proved nothing other than 
that the accused was and intended to be in the back alley by the door 
of the gun shop. This was indeed suspicious, but not proof of any of 
the above mentioned ingredients to the allegation against the accused. 
The matter argued before the Supreme Court of Canada was whether the 
Crown could appeal the acquittal. The Crown can only appeal an 
acquittal if the grounds for the appeal i'flvolve a question of law 
alone*. In this case the trial judge had found as a fact that there 
was no evidence to prove the intent to break and enter or to commit an 
indictable offence once inside. The Supreme Court of Canada held that 
where some burden of proof is not upon the accused (which there would 
have been had section 306(2)(c) C.C. applied) "there is always some 
evidence upon which to make a finding of fact favourable to the 
accused, and such a finding, if in error, is an error of fact". 
Therefore the Crown could not appeal. 
Accused's appeal allowed. 
Acquittal restored. 
Note: Whether there is any evidence to find a fact is a question of 
law; if there is sufficient evidence is a question of fact. 
When at the close of the Crown's case it is submitted that there is no 
evidence against the accused, a question of law is raised and if the 
motion goes down in defeat, a defence can be presented. If such a 
motion is one challenging the sufficiency of evidence in regards to 
what was alleged, a question of fact is raised and that then is the 
defence. In other words the accused is then blocked from presenting 
evidence in his defence. 
Another example of the distinction between a point of fact and one of 
law is demonstrated when the Court is composed of a judge and a jury. 
Whether evidence is capable of concluding a certain fact is a question 
of law and for the judge to decide. However, making that conclusion 
is a question of fact and a matter for the jury. 
* * * * * 
* Section 60S(l)(a) Criminal Code of Canada 
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DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER -
MEANING OF "PLANNED AND DELIBERATE" AND "DELIBERATE" 
Re Talbot and The Queen 21 C.C.C. (2d) 390 
Ontario High Court of Justice 
The woman the accused lived with had announced she was leaving him. 
He loved her deeply and had told her that he could not.survive without 
her'. ; on the morning the woman was to le_ave' the accused had pleaded 
(to no · avail) with her in the bathroom while she was putting" on her 
make-up. He left the bathroom only to return shortly after with ·· a 
knife. She asked him if he intended to take her life. He had replied 
to have no choice as he could not live without her. "He put the point 
of the knife · below her ribs" and for a while they stood there looking 
at each other·. ·. He, while · kissing her and saying good-bye, had 
thrusted the knife in. He had then guided her to the bathtub where· 
she' died. The accused had covered the deceased up' cleaned the bath-
room and went to police where he calmly told officers what happened. 
In his statement to police the accused had said that in relation to 
the action he took, he "had started to think about it last night" when 
they had discussed her intention to leave. 
The accused had been connnitted to stand trial for first degree 
murd.er. The accused argued that the Crown's evidence failed to prove 
that the murder was "planned and deliberate" and he applied that his 
committal for trial be quashed. It was understood that if the 
accused's application was successful he would stand trial for second 
degree murder. 
The Court relied on two similar dramatic cases for guidance in this 
application. One* was decided by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 
Two hunters in a party of three, got into an argument. The third 
hunter, who was a witness to it all, told how both men stood with 
their shot-guns in hand. The one promised to put his gun down if the 
other would do the same. Apparently this arrangement did not come off 
as the defendant had blasted the deceased in the shoulder. Bleeding 
profusely the deceased ran away then stopped, turned around yelling 
and screaming at the defendant. While telling the deceased to "shut-
up" he had reloaded his gun. The deceased ran again and the accused 
let go another two blasts from some distance. Some pellets hit the 
back of the deceased. The deceased sat down with his knees pulled up 
and his head resting on his knees. The defendant then had placed the 
barrel of his shotgun up against the back of the deceased ' s head and 
fired. 
* R. v. Smith (1979) 51 c.c.c. (2d) 381. Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal. 
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The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had held that the killing was 
deliberate but not planned and conviction for first degree murder had 
been set aside. 
In the second case the Ontario Court of Appeal had reviewed a case 
where the male accused followed his female victim for 25 miles. He 
continuously rammed the woman's car while each were travelling down 
the highway. Finally he had forced his victim into a ditch. She 
did escape from the car and ran a i;Jhort distance with the accused 
right on her heels. When he caught up to her he slashed her · throat 
causing her death. Despite the very deliberate aspects of this hein-
ous crime, there was no evidence that the murder was planned. A 
conviction of second degree murder was substituted for the conviction 
of first degree murder. 
The evidence in these cases was as consistent with the killings being 
planned as it was consistent with them being deliberate but not 
planned. The Ontario High Court of Justice in this Talbot case held, 
like the other Courts, that "planned" must retain its ordinary mean-
ing. 
For instance one may think about making a trip. That thinking, held 
the Court, is a step preceding any planning of that trip. 
Committed for first degree murder quashed. 
Accused to stand trial for second degree 
murder. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Rueger, 17 c.c.c. (3d) 347. Ontario Court of Appeal. 
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"A POLICE OFFICER ACTING IN THE COURSE OF HIS DUTIES" 
Regina v. Prevost and Lepage - 22 C.C.C. (3d) 225 
Ontario High Court of Justice 
Two constables took their one-hour lunch break at 1: 00 a.m. in a 
coffee shop. They were members of the O.P.P. in full uniform, who had 
complied with all requirements set by their employer to take the 
break. The Crown had also produced in evidence the collect! ve agree--
ment to show the officers' entitlement to the break. 
The two accused walked up to the officers and from 5 feet away Prevost 
levelled a shotgun at one of them and fired. The officer was killed 
instantly. 
The accused were charged with first degree murder by virtue of section 
214( 4)(a) C.C. which stipulates that murder is first degree murder 
when the victim is a police officer acting in the course of his duty. 
The · accused who admittedly shot and killed the · officer argued that 
the officer, ·· at the time of the murder, was not acting in the course 
of his duty. The "act'' the constable carried out was eating lunch, 
which has nothing to do with his duties. There is nothing in any 
statute, common law or in the constable's job description that touches 
on the taking of a break or eating lunch, argued defence counsel. 
Crown counsel submitted that unless a police officer "abuses his legal 
powers or engages in a frolic of his own" he is throughout his tour of 
duty acting in the course of his duty. A policeman having lunch while 
on shift may not be executing his duty (as used in the sections deal-
ing with obstruction and assault of a peace officer) but he is in the 
course of his duties said the prosecutor. 
Defence counsel had argued that the word "acting" is key in the phrase 
"acting in the course of his dutes". "Course" is the kernel word res-
ponded the Court. A police officer on shift acts in the course of his 
duties as long as he acts as he is authorized to act. The Court said: 
"In other words, 'to act in the course of his duties' 
relates to the notion of the state of being or status of a 
police officer during his tour of duty or when reacting to 
a breach of the peace committed outside his tour of duty, 
rather than to the requirement to execute specific 
duties". 
This includes being on a lunch or coffee· break said the Gourt but not 
while visiting "his paramour or a bootlegger to indulge in his person-
al gratifications". Consequently the Court declined to direct the 
jury that it could not convict the accused for first degree murder . 
* * * * * 
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REVERSED ONUS PROVISIONS AND THE CHARTER 
SECTION 8 NARCOTICS CONTROL ACT 
Regina v. Oakes, Supreme Court of Canada, February 1986. 
The accused was found in possession of eight one-gram vials of hashish 
oil. He was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
After having proved possession, the Crown relied on s. 8 of the Narco-
tics Control Act for the accused to establish that he was not in 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. As he failed to call 
evidence, the provincial court judge found that the possession was for 
the purpose of trafficking. 
The accused brought a motion to challenge the constitutional validity 
of s. 8 N.C.A. He argued that the provision, creating a reversed onus 
in that an accused person must establish his innocence in regards to a 
major aspect of the allegation against him, places an unreasonable 
limit on the guarantee of the right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty*. The presumption of innocence means that the burden of 
proof is on the Crown and that the accused has a right to remain 
silent. S. 8 N.C.A. flies in the face of both ingredients to the 
presumption of innocence argued the accused. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the accused and the Crown took 
this constitutional question to the Supreme Court of Canada which 
agreed with the findings of the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Court 
exercised its obligations under s. 52(1) of the Charter and ruled that 
s. 8 N.C.A., due to its unconstitutional provisions, is of no force or 
effect. 
Comment: This ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada is not surpris-
ing. Even in pre-Charter days the validity of s. 8 N.C.A. was 
questioned and tested quite fequently. Of all reverse onus clauses in 
our statutes, this seemed the most flagrant one. Charter or not, the 
section would eventually have been repealed or be ruled inoperable. 
What is interesting is what the Supreme Court of Canada did say and 
did not say about "reverse-onus" provisions. In our statutes and at 
common law there are provisions which allow a fact to be inferred if 
certain prerequisite fundamental facts have been proven. These 
provisions are commonly known as rebuttable presumptions. Some 
examples are the "care or control" presumption (s. 237(l)(a) C.C.); 
the presumption that goods obtained by a N.S.F. cheque are obtained by 
a false pretence unless the accused had reasonable grounds for 
believing there were sufficient funds to his credit (s. 320(4) C.C.); 
* R. v. Burge, Volume 22, page 16 of this publication. 
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the presumption of knowledge that the possessor of a. car or car parts 
were stolen if the serial number has been obliterated (312(2) and (3) 
C.C.); the presumption that a person intended to commit an indictable 
offence in the place he broke into; etc.. Usually, if the presumption 
provides for an excuse, exemption, some proviso, or qualification, 
then the burden of proving that such condition negating that the 
presumption exists, is on the accused. 
Rebuttable presumptions have been attacked as being contrary to the 
principles of justice prior to the Charter, but since the Charter came 
into effect the attacks have . increased. Some of these presumptions 
have not survived the "Charter test". For instance the provision that 
a person who possesses counterfeit money is guilty of that indictable 
offence, unless he . proves some justification or excuse for that 
possession, was ruled to be unconstitutional by the County Court of 
Yale*. The Charter test is quite simple and known as the "rational 
connection test". The proven fundamental facts must have the presumed 
fact as a probable consequence. In regards to the counterfeit money, 
one can receive such a bill in the normal course of his business. 
Knowledge or criminal uttering are simply not probable consequences of 
possession. Needless to say that s. 410 C.C. is not a simple rebut-
table presumption but a reversed-onus . provision. 
Those who oppose rebuttable presumptions' may well claim victory on 
account of this Oakes ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada. However, 
that claim may well be premature. The Supreme Court specifically 
referred to provisions where an accused must disprove a presumed fact 
"which is an important . element of the offence in question". In 
respect to the "rational connection test" the Supreme Court of Canada 
said that it does not survive the interpretation of the presumption of 
innocence if the rebuttable presumption is used "to justify a reversed 
onus provision". In other words the Court referred to rebuttable 
presumptions containing a reverse onus provision only. 
Nearly all reversed onus clauses contain a provision to presume a 
fact. The Supreme Court of Canada observed that it may well be 
rational and probable that the presumed fact is a consequence of the 
basic proven fact. However, to say that the presumed fact is beyond a 
reasonable doubt is going too far. Therefore, "the appropriate stage 
for invoking the rational connection test is under s. 1 of the 
Charter", said the Court. That implies that the "section 1 test" 
includes the rational connection test". 
The Court held that the onus to show that a limitation of any right or 
freedom (a rebuttable presumption of course is a limitation of the 
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty) is reasonable and 
demonstrably justified is on the party seeking to uphold the limita-
tion. That, of course, is in nearly all cases the Crown. The 
* R. v. liurge, Volume 22, page 16 of this publication. 
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burden of proof is "a preponderance of probabilities" which must be 
rigorously applied emphasized the Court. 
Some of the criteria to show a justification for a limitation of a 
right or freedom are: 
1. the standard of the test must be high to ensure that the object-
ive served by the limitation is not trivial or totally out of 
harmony with principles of a free and democratic society; 
2. the objective of the limitation must relate to substantial and 
pressing social concerns; 
3. the limitation must be fair, not arbitrary, achieve its objective 
and impair the right or freedom "as little as possible"; and 
4. there must be a proportional relationship between the effects of 
the limitation -of a right or freedom and the objective the 
limitation serves. In other words, the more noxious the limita-
tion the more important the objective must be. 
As to the objectives of s. 8 N.C.A., the Court held that they were in 
respect to a very serious and pressing social concern. 
It would, in "certain cases" pass the "s. 1 test". However the Court 
held that s. 8 N.C.A. would fail the "rational connection test". 
There simply was no rational connection between the basic fact of 
possession and the presumed fact of possession for the purpose of 
trafficking". Possession of a small quantity of narcotics does not 
support the inference of trafficking, said the Court. 
* * * * * 
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SJ!\F'ETY HELMETS 
Regina v. Houniet, County Court of Westminster, New Westminster 
Registry No. X015396, November, 1985. 
The accused was found riding his motorcycle without a safety helmet 
and was acquitted of the offence Section 218 of the B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Act seems to create for such an event. The Crown appealed the acquit-
tal. 
The Provincial Court judge had found that the law was so ambiguous 
that no one can determine with any certainty if a safety helmet 
complies with the regulations under the Motor Vehicle Act. Such 
inability violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Evidence showed that there are many safety helmets on the market. 
Some meet partially the standards of the five criteria set out in the 
schedule to the B. C. Regulations 318/80. Others do not meet the 
standards at all, while some comply totally. Extensive testing was 
required to determine this. The standards in the Regulations are, in 
essence, no more than a bibliography on the topic of protective head 
gear. These publications are not readily, if at all, available and 
one nearly requires to be an expert to make sure a helmet complies 
with all five standards· referred to in the schedule. In other words, 
one is required to comply with a law that is simply not available. To 
convict anyone on the basis of law which leaves citizens unable to 
determine what that law is, is contrary to the "principles of funda-
mental justice". 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
* * * * * 
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CARE AND CONTROL 
Regina v. Godin, The County Court of Cariboo, Williams Lake, 
CCBS-1496, October 1985. 
The accused parked his truck, got into a friend's vehicle, and went 
with him to a pub where he drank for several hours. The accused's 
wife · came to the pub and told him to make sure he phoned her for a 
ride when it came time to go home. When that time came, the accused 
arranged for his wife to meet him at his truck. Before she arrived 
the police spotted the truck and found the accused behind the wheel, 
his feet near the pedals and his torso and he.ad on the passenger's 
seat. The engine was running. 
In view of the Toews' decision by the Supreme Court of Canada* the 
Provincial Court Judge had acquitted the accused of impaired care and 
control. Although it had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused occupied the driver's seat, he had shown on a balance of 
probabilities that he had no intention to drive. He had used his car 
as a warm place to wait for his wife and not as a means of transporta-
tion. The Crown appealed this acquittal. 
The County Court Judge summed up the law as follows: 
"A person who does not use or intend to use his motor 
vehicle as a motor vehicle but rather as something else 
such as a bedroom in Toews or a party room in Ford** 
cannot be convicted of having the care and control--of a 
motor vehicle under s. 234(1) or s. 236(1) unless he uses 
or intends to use the motor vehicle or its fittings and 
equipment or his conduct in relation to the motor vehicle 
is such as--Would involve a risk of putting the vehicle in 
motion so that it could become dangerous". 
(Emphasis is mine) 
Although the accused had no intentions of using the truck as a motor 
vehicle he had used its fittings and equipment. That, considering the 
condition he was in, was dangerous in the circumstances. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Accused convicted of care and control while 
impaired by alcohol. 
* * * * * 
* Volume 22 - page 24 of this publication. 
** Volume 5 - page 23 of this publication. 
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"FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF CHARTER RIGHTS" 
Regina v. Cornelius, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Victoria 
Registry No. 843026, September 1985 
In Saskatchewan, police officers failed to inform a Mr. Therens (who 
was under demand to give samples of his breath) that he had a right to 
counsel. The Supreme Court of Canada! considered that to be a "flag-
rant" violation of Mr. Therens' Charter rights and held that the 
certificate of analyses was consequentially not admissible in 
evidence. 
Considering the law in 1983 and the Supreme Court of Canada's own 
views on "detention and demand"2 in pre Charter days, the word 
"flagrant" seemed unbefitting to describe the infringement of Therens' 
rights. At least two Courts of superior jurisdiction in B.C. have now 
searched for the reason for our highest Court calling the infringement 
a "flagrant" one . 
The B.C. Court of Appeal in R. v. Gladstone3 found, by reading the 
reasons for judgement by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 4 when it 
dealt with the Therens case, that there had been a directive from the 
provincial Attorney General directly· after the Charter coming into 
effect that police were to consider a person they made a demand of for 
samples of breath, to. be detained. The non compliance with that 
directive by the constable caused the Supreme Court of Canada to 
consider the infringement of Therens' right to be flagrant, concluded 
the B. C. Court of Appeal. 
In British Columbia there was no directive to police on the status of 
a. person under demand to give breath samples. This publication which 
is distributed in the B. c. police community did report on the rulings 
by the Courts on this issue. For instance a decision by a Vancouver 
County Court Judge 5 in March of 1983, and several other cases , are 
examples of the Courts then holding that a demand did not trigger 
detention. 
In this Cornelius case, the arresting officer testified (prior to the 
Therens decision by the Supreme Court of Canada) that the accused had 
voluntarily got into the police car in response to the demand. He had 
occupied the passenger side of the front seat and had not been 
restrained in any way. The officer had not informed the accused of 
his right to counsel. When he was examined on this point he testified 
1 R. v. Therens, Volume 21, page 1 of this publication 
2 Chromiak v. The Queen 49 C.C.C. (2d) 257 or Volume 1, page 3 of 
3 
this publication 
R. v. Gladstone, Volume 22, page 22 of this publication 
4 R. v. Therens, (1983) 33 C.R. (3d) 204 
5 R. v. Morrison, Volume 12, page 16, of this publication 
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that he had read in the Justice Institute Bulletin (assumed to be this 
publication) that in the circumstances as they were in this case it 
was not necessary to make the accused aware of his rights. The trial 
judge, as had others in that era, held that the accused had not been 
detained. However, when the appeal by the accused of his conviction 
of "over 80 mlg." reached the B.C. Supreme Court the Therens decision 
by the Supreme Court of Canada had left by then no doubt that a person 
under demand to supply breath samples is ipso facto detained. That 
means that the Charter included this in "detention" from the day it 
came into effect (April 17, 1982). 
The Crown argued that the material by the Justice Institute the 
officer read was totally different in nature than a directive from the 
Attorney General. The publication simply made the officer aware of 
various court rulings on the issue and indeed they seemed to support 
his opinion on whether he was obliged to make the accused aware of his 
right to counsel. All this ads up to, ·argued the Crown, is that the 
officer, though he may have infringed the accused's rights, did not do 
so "flagrantly". 
The Supreme Court Justice expressed some surprise on how the Supreme 
Court of Canada came to the conclusion that the Saskatchewan officer 
who made the demand of Mr. Therens had infringed his rights "flagrant-
ly". The· word flagrant means: "glaring, notorious, scandalous". 
However, the Court held that despite the "ingenious" submissions by 
the Crown, they could not be accepted for the following reasons: 
1. the Therens case does not say that the infringement caused the 
evidence to be excluded because it was "flagrantly" committed; 
2. an inferrence of innocence on the part of the officer in favour 
of the Crown would be wrong "unless it is the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the proven facts"; 
3. other inferences than those by the officer, may be drawn from the 
articles the officer read; and 
4. any doubt in this matter must be resolved in favour of the 
accused. 
Accused acquitted. 
* * * * * 
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ASSAULT TO MAKE GOOD AN ESCAPE FROM A 
LAWFUL ARREST OR FROM BEING ASSAULTED? 
Regina v. Fisher, County Court of Westminster, New Westminster 
Registry X015794, November 1985. 
The accused, a young man, was an invitee in a recreational center . He 
ran afoul of the life guards as he refused to obey them when they 
attempted to enforce the safety rules. The accused was forcibly 
ejected but returned to protest the treatment he received~ This 
approach did not settle matters and the accused was about to be 
ejected again when he picked up a bench and pushed it through a 
window. A lady, an employee of the center, witnessed all of this and 
she blocked the exit for which the accused was headed with the life-
guards in pursuit. The accused slapped the woman in the face, pushed 
her out of the way (which resulted in some tumbling) and jumped over 
her when she fell. He made good his escape but was identified and 
convicted of assault. The conviction was appealed as was the one for 
mischief in regard to the window. 
The accused said that the "bench through the window" was the result of 
accidentally running into the bench. He said he never touched the 
woman, but had merely ran ahead of her to get to the exit door. 
Furthermore, even if he had struck the woman it was done in self 
defence. After all, she was blocking the exit, his only escape route 
to get away from two hostile life guards who were chasing him. 
The defence brought to the Court's attention a case* where a father 
had entered the home where his runaway daughter was harboured. When 
he wanted to leave with the girl, the female occupant of the house 
tried to block his way. She was assaulted and the father made good 
his exit. When the father appealed his conviction for assault he was 
acquitted. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal held that while there is 
a law that empowers preventing a person to protect his or her home 
from trespassers, there is no law that empowers a trespasser from 
leaving the home. The father had committed no offence and had not 
breached the peace. He was declared a trespasser and in compliance he 
wanted to leave. 
That New Brunswick case was held to be distinct from this Fisher case, 
where the accused had committed an indictable offence in the recrea-
tional center. The lady employee had a right if not a duty to prevent 
the accused ' s escape, held the Court. 
* Shannon v. The Queen (1966) 49 C.R. 291 
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The accused then argued that the woman employee had consented to the 
assault by taking the position she did, thereby delivering him to the 
hostile lifeguards in pursuit. 
The Court rejected this notion completely and held that though a 
person may defend himself with impunity from aggressors, that does not 
include assaulting a third party. If there was necessity to assault 
the woman in these circumstances to""'iet away from the aggressors, it 
could only be reflected in the sentence and not the verdict. 
The Court also rejected that the "bench through the window" was acci-
dental, hence ••• 
both appeals dismissed. 
Convictions upheld. 
* * * * * 
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CARE OR CONTROL 
Regina v. Darbyson, County Court of Cari boo Prince George 17 50/ 84, 
November 1985. 
The accused failed to find his friends at the rendezvous for a planned 
fishing trip. He drove back home in· the dark over a very lightly 
travelled road. About half way a tire on his car went flat and as he 
had no jack the accused could not change the tire. The accused 
decided to stay with the car until daylight when he hoped some other 
motorist would come by and lend him a jack. The accused re-entered 
the car and started drinking from his supply of beer he had brought 
for the fishing expedition. 
Some time later the accused fell asleep while sitting in the driver's 
seat. He had slumped over the console and his upper torso was 
suspended over the passenger's side of the front seat. The key was in 
the ignition and in the accessory position, apparently so the radio 
would work. 
Needless to say that the Toews* decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada was brought to the Court's attention. The position of the 
ignition key was identical in Toews. The position of the accused's 
was different in that Toews was in a sleeping bag across the front 
seat. The accused was on the side of a highway while Toews was on 
private property (please note the offence of impaired driving and over 
80 mlg. have no geographical boundaries). Another distinction is that 
Toews entered his truck after drinking while the accused was sober 
when he got in his car and presumably when he placed the ignition key 
in the position in which it was found. 
The County Court Judge, dealing with .the accused's appeal in respect 
to his conviction for "impaired while in care or control" held that 
the differences in circumstances in these two cases made this case 
distinct from Toews. In regards to the key, he observed that it would 
have taken very little for the drunken accused to accidentally start 
the engine and put the car in motion. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Toews, Volume 22, page 24 of this publication. 
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Comment: The B. C. Court of Appeal touched on an issue that should 
interest the police community. As time evolves so do principles, 
theories, and certain fundamentals. Recently Professor DeLloyd J. 
Guth of the U.B.C. law school and Richard Vogel, Q.C. (previous Deputy 
Attorney General for B.C.) authored a paper "The Canadian Constable: 
An Endangered Species?" They point out that a constable is not an 
agent of the state, or the extended arm of the executive branch of 
government. He or she is a surrogate citizen (quite distinct from his 
or her U. s. counterpart) who is a civilian constable with the prime 
task to prevent crime. What is in essence the duty of every citizen, 
is carried out by this "substitute person" who has been robed with a 
special task to meet this community responsibility. There are several 
recent cases* in which the judiciary have reiterated this . fact. 
Possibly the Law Reform Commission paper, "Legal Status of the Police" 
has reminded Courts of and revived the idea that constables are citi-
zens and civilian agents of the community and not the state. Although 
in certain roles it could be fairly said that a constable is an agent 
of the state (especially of the RCMP in certain circumstances) it 
cannot be said appropriately "when applied to peace officers engaged 
in the ordinary duties of enforcing the law in the community". The 
B. C. Court of Appeal reviewed the reputation of the Canadian police 
and pretty well concluded that all the recent tongue lashing by our 
judiciary since the Charter came into effect, is unjustified. 
Priority ought to be given to protection against law breaking instead 
of concerning themselves (the judiciary) with changing police behavi-
our, implied the Court. 
Although the Court did not broach this topic, the theory that the 
Canadian constable is not an agent of the state , opens an interesting 
argument on the question: "Does the Charter apply to the constable?" 
The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench** held that the Charter applies to 
and is binding on all of us and not only to the Governments and their 
agents. When law is enacted it does not apply to the immune Crown 
unless it specifically includes itself as being subject to that law. 
The Charter, in section 32, states that it applies to the senior 
levels of government which, · of course, includes their agents. The 
Alberta superior court held that section 32 was to include the Crown 
being subject to the Charter and not to make it exclusively applicable 
to the governments. 
If the Supreme Court of Canada agrees with the Alberta Court at some 
future date, then the Charter will apply to everyone. In other words 
* Hayes v. Thompson and Bell (1986) 44 C.R. (3d) 316. 
Dedman v. The Queen, see page 17 of Volume 22 of this publica-
tion. 
** R. v. Lerke, see page 12 of Volume 19 of this publication. Also 
13 c.c.c. (3d) 515. 
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one person could seek remedy against a fellow citizen who violated his 
Charter rights or freedoms. If, however, the Charter exclusively 
applies to the governments and their agents, then, if constables 
acting as peace officers are not such agent, the Charter would not 
apply to constables. 
This, I'm sure, would not be palatable to the Courts or the community 
and our Court will probably reason that for the purpose of the 
Charter, police are embraced in the meaning of section 32. 
* * * * * 
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REFUSING TO GIVE SECOND BREATH SAMPLE 
Regina v. Hurst, County Court of Vancouver, No. CC851187 , March 1986 
"The accused saw the results of his first blow and was simply scared 
to give another one". These were, in essence, the comments of the 
trial judge when he convicted the accused of failure to give samples 
of his breath. The accused had testified that he had high blood pres-
sure and had experienced a dizzy spell when he had given the first 
sample. He had simply not blown hard enough for the second sample 
despite the fact that 5 or 6 attempts were made after which the 
accused predicted to the officers that he would probably suffer a 
heart attack if he made any more attempts. As the accused "appeared 
clammy, his complexion ••• kind of cold ••• perspiry (sic) kind of look 
to him" the officers had not pressed the matter any further. 
The accused appealed his conviction claiming that the trial judge had 
failed to give evidence supporting a "reasonble excuse" inadequate 
consideration. 
The County Court Judge declined to overturn the trial judge's find-
ings. The matter was one of credibility of witnesses and that of the 
accused. Though the trial judge did, in his reasons, not explore the 
matter of credibility, that does not mean that he did not give that 
matter due consideration, said the Court. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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B. C. POLICE ACT - CRIMINAL CODE 
GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION OF A 
MUNICIPAL CONSTABLE 
Regina v. Simmons, County Court of Vancouver, Registry CC850765, 
February 1986. 
A municipal constable observed the accused driving in the municipality 
in which he had jurisdiction. As the driving was abnormal the 
constable activated the equipment on his car to stop the accused. The 
accused did stop, but not until he had crossed the municipal boundary 
into a jurisdiction policed by the R.C.M. Police. All the right 
things were said to the accused to make demands, warn him, and make 
him aware of his rights. He was then arrested and taken to the 
officer's municipal police station. The R.C.M. Police in the juris-
diction in which the accused was stopped were not notified. 
The accused had refused to give any samples of his breath and was 
convicted accordingly. He appealed that conviction arguing that the 
municipal constable was outside his jurisdiction. To validate the 
demand for samples of breath, the officer should have complied with 
section 30(5) of the B. c. Police Act. The relevant portion of s. 30 
states that a municipal constable has, "while he is on duty in the 
course of his employment, the jurisdiction throughout the Province of 
a provincial cons table". However, when he exercises his jurisdiction 
outside his municipality he must contact the force having jurisdiction 
there beforehand, "but in any case promptly after exercising his 
jurisdiction, notify that provincial or municipal force". This the 
officer had not dorie and therefore his demand for samples of breath 
was invalid claimed the defence. Strict compliance with the provi-
sions of section 30 is the only means to extend jurisdiction beyond 
the municipal boundaries. If the Courts do not give that section his 
suggested interpretation, police officers "roving amongst various 
municipal territories" making arbitrary arrests would result, argued 
defence counsel. 
The Court considered s. 30 Police Act to consist of "good policy 
considerations" which encourages local police forces to work in co-
operation with one another. By advance contact with the other force 
having to exercise jurisdiction outside the . territory for which the 
constable is appointed, may be avoided. Letting them know afterwards 
is simply a matter of protocol and courtesy. Section 30 of the Police 
Act was not created to prevent roving gestapo or arbitrary arrests. 
The Criminal and Comm.on Law do not tolerate the chaos defence counsel 
describes, held the Court. The validity of any arrest will have to 
withstand the test of s. 450 of the Criminal Code, regardless where or 
by what constable it is made. The arrest made in this case withstood 
that test. 
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The Court added that in the circumstances leading up to the arrest, it 
is clear that not only did the officer effect a proper and lawful 
arrest, but in addition he was authorized by the common law provision 
known as fresh pursuit. The accused had been pursued by the constable 
from well within his jurisdictional territory into a neighbouring one. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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DISMISSAL OF A MUNICIPAL CONSTABLE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 
Michael Carpenter and Vancouver Police Board, Supreme Court of B.C., 
Vancouver Registry A831134, December 1985. 
Investigation revealed that the petitioner (Carpenter) was involved in 
the movement of stolen goods. In November of 1981, being a municipal 
constable at the time, he was suspended without pay and four days 
later the petitioner was called before the Chief Constable and was 
informed of the results of the investigation. At that time his 14 
years of service ended as his Chief considered his conduct so serious 
that it did constitute a fundamental breach and repudiation of the 
petitioner's contract of employment as a police officer. Consequently 
the petitioner's service with the Police Force was terminated. In 
1983 the petitioner challenged the dismissal under the Judicial Review 
Procedure Act claiming that such termination of office could only be 
affected by procedures under the Police Act and its regulation. The 
Police Board claimed the Supreme Court of the province had no juris-
diction to review the dismissal. The Supreme Court held it did and 
the Board took the matter to the B. C. Court of Appeal which upheld 
the Supreme Court decision in respect to jurisdiction. The Board was 
denied leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and hence the 
B. c. Supreme Court dealt in the fall of 1985 with the petitioner 
pleading for a declaration: 
(a) that the only powers to dismiss a municipal constable for matters 
constituting a disciplinary default are contained in the Police 
Act and appended Regulations; 
(b) that he should be reinstated with full pay and benefits retro-
active to the date that he was fired by the Chief Constable; and 
(c) that the period since the firing was a period of suspension which 
entitles him to pay and benefits back to the date of his dismis-
sal. 
The petitioner had, on the very day of his dismissal, also been 
charged criminally with breach of trust and possession of stolen 
property. In response to the firing the Chief was asked why, in view 
of the presumption of innocence, the suspension could not be extended 
until the Courts had decided on the matter of guilt or innocence. The 
Chief was also requested to say by what authority he was purporting to 
act, why the particulars of the complaint against the petitioner were 
not divulged, and why he was not given the opportunity to be confron-
ted by his accusers. The Chief Constable had declined to respond to 
these questions. 
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The bargaining unit of the Police Force grieved the petitioner ' s dis-
missal. Correspondence dated December 1981 between that Unit and the 
Chief Constable indicate that the latter agreed to a stay of proceed-
ings in respect to the determination of the grievance. Thirteen 
months later, January 1983, the petitioner was tried for the aforemen-
tioned criminal allegations before a judge and jury and was acquit-
ted. The Crown did not appeal and three months after the acquittal, 
the petition in question was filed. This petition was subject to the 
reviews and appeals outlined above, and now nearly four years later, 
the way was clear for the Supreme Court of the province to deal with 
the merits of the petition. 
The Supreme Court Justice found as a fact that the Chief Constable, 
the petitioner, and the Union had all viewed the dismissal for 
(reasons amounting to a disciplinary default) as something within the 
ambit of the collective agreement. This was clear from statements, 
correspondence, and affidavits. The petition clearly indicated that 
Carpenter (the petitioner) had changed his mind on this. He claimed 
that the Collective Agreement does not govern this matter but the 
Police Act and its Regulations. This view was found to be correct 
when the Police Board challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to deal 
with the petition. Hence this Supreme Court Justice held that since 
the dismissal of the petitioner had not been in compliance with the 
Police Act Regulations, he had been deprived of his rights under those 
Regulations and was entitled to the relief he sought. 
Having so determined, the Court had a discretion what relief to grant 
the petitioner. In pursuading the Justice not to grant anything, the 
Police Board submitted that· the petitioner's delay in filing the 
petition (17 months after his dismissal) had resulted in a prejudice 
to the Board (the respondent). Cases show a precedent that: 
"Delay, coupled with prejudice to a respondent, may 
increase the disinclination to grant such discretionary 
relief". 
Furthermore, argued the Police Board, considering the questions the 
petitioner and his counsel put to the Chief Constable at the time the 
former was fired, clearly indicated awareness on the part of the 
petitioner that there was a non-compliance with the Police Act Regula-
tions. They specifically asked the Chief why he had not followed the 
procedures set out in those Regulations. Instead of immediately 
filing this petition, they went the route of grievance. In other 
words, if the petitioner is of .the opinion that this judicial review 
is the appropriate process, he should have gone that route immediate-
ly. Now the Police Board would have to pay the petitioner for all the 
time he (and not the Police Board) had wasted should the Court grant 
the relief he asked for. The relief was available to him then as "it 
is now" and the Court agreed that there were no compelling reasons for 
"the long delay in instituting these proceedings". 
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In reviewing the matter of prejudice to the Board, the Justice 
observed that the Chief Constable had included in his reasons for 
dismissal of the petitioner that he had "been involved in a relation-
ship with certain people in this city whose behaviour is of a criminal 
nature ••• ". The Court reasoned that the criminal charges alleged 
against the petitioner did not include that relationship which the 
Court considered to amount to a disciplinary default. Therefore, it 
had been open to the Chief to allege the criminal behaviour and the 
criminal association against the petitioner. Then when the alleged 
criminal behaviour was pursued in the criminal courts, the disciplin-
ary proceedings could have been adjourned sine die (undetermined 
date). The acquittal would have prevented continuation of the crimin-
al behaviour as a disciplinary default (s. 10(3) Police (Discipline) 
Regulations) but the disciplinary proceedings could have continued 
with the criminal association allegation*. 
Had the petitioner proceeded in a timely manner after his dismissal, 
then the Chief Constable could have commenced disciplinary proceedings 
before the limitation of action clause in the Regulations prevented 
this. Therefore, the Board was prejudiced by the petitioner's delay. 
Then, the Supreme Court considered the dictum that the extraordinary 
remedy the petitioner sought, is in jeopardy when there is failure to 
follow and take advantage of an ordinary remedy available to him. Did 
Carpenter, the petitioner, have such an ordinary remedy available to 
him when he was summarily dismissed? 
The Court examined section 38 of the Discipline Regulations and found 
that one of the grounds for an appeal to the Police Board is depriva-
tion of a fair trial in accordance with principles set out in the 
Police Act. Section 36 of the Regulations says that where the presid-
ing officer is a Chief Constable there is a right to appeal to the 
Board and following that appeal, if still aggrieved, there is a right 
for further appeal to the Police Commission. The petitioner indicated 
immediately upon his dismissal, by means of the questions he had put 
to the Chief Constable that he had been deprived of a fair trial. 
This caused the Supreme Court Justice to say: 
"I conclude that under the Regulations there was an alter-
native remedy available to the petitioner to pursue. He 
failed to do so... In views of the petitioner's delay in 
filing this petition and in view of there being an 
adequate alternative remedy available to the petitioner 
which he failed to pursue, I exercise my discretion· and 
refuse to grant the relief sought herein". 
Carpenter's petition was dismissed . 
* * * * * 
* The Court seems to refer to discreditable conduct. 
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"RECENT COMPLAINT" 
Regina v. George, 23 C.C.C. 3d) 42 
British Columbia Court of Appeal. 
The accused, a 17 year old man, lived with his relatives who had a 14 
year old daughter, a cousin to the accused. She was described by the 
Court as a shy, naive, docile child who had been protected by her 
parents from the world and things like television. One night the 
family had been out and all returned home in one car. The accused had 
his arm around the girl's shoulders and he had run his hand up her 
legs without any resistance. After everyone had gone to bed the 
accused went to his cousin's bedroom. He took off her panties and had 
sexual as well as anal intercourse with her. The girl had not consen-
ted but had submitted to the accused's advances for fear of being 
ridiculed by the family if she created a disturbance. When the 
accused later in the morning came back for seconds, she told him to 
leave and he did. 
On her way to school that day the girl called in on her life's confi-
dante, her grandmother. She did not get much of a chance to tell 
anything as her grandmother was not feeling well. On the complain-
ant's way home her grandmother listened and the girl told what had 
happened between her and her cousin, the accused. This resulted in 
the parents and the grandmother confronting the accused. He confessed 
and apologized. Subsequent medical examination of the girl confirmed 
intercourse and also that she had been a virgin up until this inci-
dent. When the police were called the accused went to a friend's 
house to seek haven. A priest advised the accused to go to the police 
and confess. The accused complied with that advice and was convicted 
of sexual assault and appealed. 
One of the grounds for appeal was that the Crown had adduced evidence 
from the grandmother, the parents, and the doctor of what had happened 
the night before. This is hearsay evidence which used to be an exemp-
tion to the hearsay rule, known as "recent complaint". Since s. 246.5 
C.C. came into effect this exemption is abrogated*. Prior to the 
abrogation "recent complaint" evidence was always looked for and in 
some cases, nearly an essential part of the Crown's case. For those 
who are unfamiliar with this evidence rule a brief explanation may be 
of assistance to understand the position taken by the defence in this 
case. "Recent complaint" stems from the belief that a person 
* Bill C-127, Proclaimed January 4, 1983. 
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(mostly women) who claimed to have been attacked and who did not at 
the first possible opportunity raise a "hue and cry", had perhaps 
consented to it or had fabricated all or parts of her version of the 
incident. The indignation, it was reasoned, should have led to an 
irresistable urge to let it be known to confidants what had happened. 
That "first complaint" (which had to be recent in relation to the 
incident) was admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay 
rule to show a consistency of conduct on the part of the complainant 
and to probe that such a complaint was made. (Note that the evidence 
of the complaint was not proof of the truth of its content, but only 
served to prove that it was made). The absence of a "recent 
complaint" compelled judges to instruct juries that such absence had 
to be considered in determining the complainant's credibility. In 
other words the "recent complaint" rule was a result of a defense 
ploy to attack the credibility of a complainant if there was no such 
complaint. Actually section 246.S C.C. does not seem to prevent 
either party to the criminal dispute to ask the question of the 
complainant if she complained to anyone without adducing the content 
of the complaint. In this case it seems that the complainant had 
"blurted" out evidence of the complaints she lodged to her confidant 
and it went from there. 
This case is perhaps a prime example how we will fare in cases of 
sexual assaults without "recent complaint". Defence counsel did like 
his professional forefathers had done. He suggested that the girl had 
consented, but changed her mind and · had therefore complained to her 
grandmother (this was the "blurted" evidence). Then to rebut this 
allegation of fabrication all of it had come out, which seems improper 
in view of s. 246.S C.C. However, there was another complication. 
The accused had made a confession to the family before the police were 
involved. What he was confronted with is what the family had learned 
from the "recent complaint" by the girl. The confession would be 
incomplete and of no value unless it was known what the defendant was 
accused of. Without that it would be like only reading the utterances 
of one party to a dialogue. 
To complicate matters further, the girl's father had said to the 
accused: "Martin did you force yourself on Crystal sexually"? The 
accused's answer was in the affirmative. The trial judge had instruc-
ted the jury (presumably as this question was derived from a recent 
complaint) that they were not to consider the answer as evidence to 
prove the truth of its content. 
Needing Solomon's wisdom to get out of this, the B. C. Court of Appeal 
applied the provision of s. 613(l)(b)(:Ui) C.C. which states that 
where an appeal court finds that an error has been made, hut that the 
error had not caused an injustice or altered an appropriate verdict , 
then it can uphold that verdict despite the error . 
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The Court of Appeal arrived at this conclusion as there was no reason-
able doubt that the girl had not consented and that the accused did 
not have an honest mistaken belief that she was consenting. Also, the 
accused's testimony had been like a confession. He clearly admitted 
to know there was no consent and he knew that at the time of the 
sexual assault . 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
Comment: The transcripts of Senate Committee hearings on Bill C-127 
are revealing in regards to the quantum changes that Bill made to our 
criminal law in 1983. However, I have not found any explanation why 
"recent complaint" was abrogated. Unless we also abrogate the defence 
right to raise the issue of credibility due to lack of "hue and cry" 
or a change of heart on the part of the complainant since the sexual 
encounter, the one-sided prohibition will create unnatural trial 
scenarios. One could argue that s. 246.S C.C. applies equally to both 
parties in a criminal dispute. However, it seems doubtful that since 
consent and honest mistaken belief in respect to consent are so close-
ly related to issues touching on "recent complaint" that this prohibi-
tion clause can be complied with without causing an unfair imbalance 
at the detriment of either party. 
Another interesting point is that s. 246.S only abrogates the recent 
complaint rule in respect to sexual assaults. At one time it was 
assumed to apply to rape (as it then was) and female victims only. 
Later it was extended to all persons and in regards to any offence 
that could or did cause hysteria to a victim. Evidence of "recent 
complaint" was admitted in cases of unlawful confinement, kidnapping 
and indecent assault on a male person*. In view of the specific word-
ing of s. 246.S C.C. there seems nothing to prevent application of 
this old common law rule of evidence in cases other than sexual 
assault. 
* * * * * 
* See Regina v. Fromme 31 c.c .c. (2d) 332 . 
- 37 -
SEARCH WARRANT TO CATCH TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE 
Regina v. Hart et. al., Supreme Court of British Columbia, Victoria, 
B.C. No. 36411, c., November 1985. 
A Justice of the Peace issued a search warrant under s. 10 of the 
Narcotic Control Act for a home. "There was a proper purpose for the 
issuance of this warrant" said the Supreme Court Justice who enter-
tained the motion by the defence that the warrant be quashed. 
However, the warrant was granted for an eight day period. This was to 
accommodate the apprehension of a suspect who was expected to be in 
"the area of the premises" within that period. The second reason, of 
course, was not contained in the information although the Justice of 
the Peace had been made aware of it. This all had surfaced during a 
preliminary hearing. 
Defence counsel submitted that all this amounted to the search warrant 
to be granted for two reasons, one of which was only lawful. 
The Supreme Court Justice agreed. He held that the home had been 
exposed to search for 8 days while the reason for this extended period 
had nothing to do with the grounds on which the warrant may be 
granted. Also the reasons were unconnected with the occupant of the 
home. That was in the circumstances unreasonable. Therefore the 
warrant was issued on grounds contrary to the "unreasonable search" 
provision contained in the Charter. 
Search Warrant ordered quashed. 
Note: The justice deliberately did not order what had to happen to 
the material seized by means of the warrant. (These items were 
illegal to possess). He said that that should be decided under the 
Charter provision to exclude evidence when and if a trial is held. He 
also emphasized that issuing a warrant extended over a longer period 
of time is not improper if done for a legitimate reason. In this case 
however, there were other legal means for police to attain their 
second objective (the apprehension of a wanted person). 
* * * * * 
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CONCOCTED EVIDENCE BY THE ACCUSED 
Regina v. Webster, B. C. Court of Appeal, CA 004232, January 1986 
The accused had been convicted of breaking into a suite next door to 
his residence and having committed theft therein. The evidence was 
circumstantial and showed that the accused was familiar with the suite 
as he had been a visitor there. The accused also knew the occupant 
worked nightshif t. Furthermore a jar of coins was among the stolen 
property and a trail of coins from beneath the window through which 
the perpetrator entered and made his exit led right to the accused's 
back door. A fingerprint of the accused was found on the window in a 
position consistent with where one would have to put his hands to open 
the window from the outside. 
When the accused was questioned by police the following day he denied 
the offence and said the only time he was on the property next door 
was when he played with his dog. 
At his trial the accused testified how he and a friend had been 
shooting a pellet gun on the day before the offence. One pellet had 
ricocheted and he (the accused) had climbed up on the window ledge to 
examine the glass for possible damage. In the process he had touched 
the window. His friend also testified in support of the accused's 
testimony. However, there had been a number of direct inconsistencies 
between the testimony of the two. The trial judge had concluded that 
the accused's evidence was concocted. He further held that the 
concocted evidence was an item of circumstantial evidence and took 
this into account when he considered the verdict. The concocted 
explanation by the accused demonstrated a consciousness of guilt, the 
judge had said. 
The accused's counsel argued before the Court of Appeal that when 
evidence has been rejected as being untruthful, it should be treated 
as if it had not been given. Consequently the accused's testimony was 
without weight and should not have received any consideration adverse 
to his interest. 
The Court of Appeal, summing up the law on this point, said that 
simply not believing testimony by an accused, is distinct from 
evidence of fabrication. On the other hand clear "fabrication of 
evidence by an accused in support of his case is a circumstance from 
which consciousness of guilt may be inferred, although it is not 
conclusive evidence of guilt". 
Legal history shows this particularly in the area of alibis. If an 
accused fails to prove the specific fact of alibi that does not mean 
that that is evidence against him. However, if it is found that that 
failure is . due to proven perjurous testimony, then it is evidence 
against the accused. Mere disbelief is not proof of fabrication , 
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warns "Wigmore on Evidence"*· 
In this case the trial judge had not merely disbelieved the accused ' s 
testimony, he had found it to have been concocted. This left one 
thing to be decided which is an exception to this rule. If an accused 
concocts evidence out of fear or panic then it may not be treated as 
evidence against him. 
The trial judge had considered the accused's opportunity to give his 
"pellet gun" explanation to the police when questioned. He had held 
that it had not been withheld at that time because of "youthful embar-
rassment, fear of adult authority, or reasonable apprehension of 
difficulty with authorities". If he had no such fears when questioned 
he must be assumed not to have had them when he voluntarily testified. 
Then the accused argued that to find that disbelieved evidence is 
concocted requires support in evidence. If there is no such basis for 
finding that evidence is concocted, then it simply amounts to jumping 
to a conclusion. Consciousness of guilt must never be assumed just 
because the accused is not believed. The Court agreed but reminded 
that determining concoction is finding a fact. A fact may be found on 
direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the 
two. The contradiction in the accused's own evidence and the incon-
sistencies between his testimony and that of his friend was all 
evidence that supported the finding of concoction. 
"All those matters smacked of deliberate fabrication" said the Court 
of Appeal. 
The total evidence was sufficient to convict the accused. 
Accused's appeal dismissed . 
Conviction upheld . 
* * * * * 
* 3rd ed. (1940) Vol. 2, p. 126. 
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KIDNAPPING - MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS ARISING FROM ONE DELICT 
Regina v. Hillis, County Court of Prince Rupert, Terrace Registry 
7817-C, November 1985. 
The accused and one "Derrick" hailed a taxi late at night. The 
driver, a woman, was ordered to take them to an outlying area. While 
on their way, the accused, from the back seat, grabbed the driver's 
hair, held a formidable knife to her neck, and ordered her to drive to 
a remote area. 
After reaching their destination and while threatened by the knife the 
woman was ordered to take her pants down and was then raped, first by 
the accused, then by Derick. While the latter was committing the act, 
the accused turned the taxi around. All this done the woman reminded 
them: "I thought you weren't going to kill me". The response was: 
"We lied". The woman then screamed and when the accused walked 
towards her with the knife she said: 'T am pregnant, don't hurt my 
baby". The accused seemed unimpressed and attempted to stab her in 
the stomach. The woman struggled, ran about 20 yards and then fell. 
The accused then inflicted at least four serious stab wounds to her 
stomach area. The twosome then dragged the woman to the side of the 
road and placed her shoulders on a tree branch so that her head was 
hanging backwards. The accused then slashed the woman's throat 
twice. As her eyes remained open he stabbed her in the neck. The 
woman then played dead by closing her eyes. The two then took off in 
the taxi obviously leaving her for dead. One and one-half hours later 
the woman was found close to death. She however survived. The two 
men were apprehended in the taxi some hours later. 
These events resulted in a nine count indictment which included 
allegations of attempted murder, kidnapping, aggrevated assault, 
robbery and possession of stolen property (the taxi). They did plead 
guilty to aggrevated sexual assault, robbery, aggrevated sexual 
assault and using a weapon in committing the offence. 
In respect to the attempted murder charge, the defence claimed a lack 
of proof of the specific intent to cause death at the time the wounds 
were inflicted. The Court found: 
"... that those acts are not consistent with any intent 
other than the intent to kill. These are not the acts of 
a person acting in panic or reacting to her attempt to 
flight. They were deliberate acts of violence calculated 
to cause death... The accused had a motive to kill. He 
had just committed two serious crimes; sexual assault and 
robbery. . .. She was the only witness apart from Derrick 
and her death would silence her . " 
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The accused was convicted of attempted murder . 
In regard to the kidnapping the Court found that although the victim 
did the driving, she was in the accused's control, confined and trans-
ported by him. This was leading up to and separate from the attempted 
murder. Therefore the dictum of no multiple convictions arising from 
one delict did not apply and accordingly the accused was convicted of 
this offence as well. 
The accused's arguments about multiple convictions became more valid 
when he argued the charge of possession of stolen property. He had 
already pleaded guilty to robbery. When one commits a robbery one is 
inevitably in possession of stolen property. At common law possession 
is an included offence to theft due to the fact that the latter is an 
act of necessity to the former. However, the judge convicted the 
accused without reference to the "included offence" concept. 
The same approach was taken to the charges of possession of a weapon 
dangerous to the public peace and forcibly seizing the taxi driver. 
Again one could argue the Kienapple* decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the former and the included offence principle in the latter 
charge. Without any reference to either, the accused was convicted of 
these charges as well. 
Comment: Perhaps it shows between the lines that I am surprised at 
some of the convictions. This strictly from a legal viewpoint. Based 
on the facts found by the Court I have no sympathy for the accused . 
* * * * * 
* 
Kienapple v. The Queen (1974) 15 c.c.c. (2d) 524. 
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WHO TO BELIEVE - THE CREDIBLE VICTIM OR THE 
EQUALLY CREDIBLE ACCUSED 
Regina v. Brinley, Vancouver County Court, C.C. 850728, February 1986. 
If the female complainant is to be believed, the accused committed an 
indecent act with her as the victim. She had been a good witness and 
had withstood the tests in cross-examination very well. The trial 
judge had been impressed and had believed her and convicted the 
accused. His demeanor had also been excellent and he had withstood 
the test of cross-examination very well. The accused's evidence 
contradicted the complainant's evidence completely. He simply denied 
that the indecent act ever took place. The accused was convicted and 
had received a conditional discharge. The accused appealed claiming 
that his equally believable testimony should have raised a reasonable 
doubt. Such doubt should have affected the verdict and not the 
sentence. The latter as the accused probably implied that his 
discharge was a judicial pacifier. (The underlined is my perception 
of the limited referral to this aspect). 
One portion of the trial judge's reasons for judgement seems to sum up 
his dilemma: 
"Having considered the matter and heard submissions, I 
reject the evidence of Mr. Brinley (the accused) as being 
untruthful, and I accept the accuracy and the account of 
Miss Atkinson (complainant). I am satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused did the act that he is 
accused of doing" . 
The trial judge had started his lengthy reasons for judgement by 
remarking that the whole case hinged on choosing between two different 
sets of evidence. There, according to the County Court Judge deciding 
the accused's appeal, is where he made a mistake. Quoting the Ontario 
Court of Appeal* and applying its view, the County Court pointed out: 
"It is a reversible error for a trial judge to choose 
between the evidence of the complainant and that of the 
accused without considering the question whether the 
prosecutor has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". 
The way the case was reasoned to reach a verdict, the County Court 
Judge felt that it was best to order a new trial. He rejected the 
application by the accused to have a verdict of acquittal entered. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. P.M., 31 C.R. (3d) 311 (1983) 
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SEARCH - POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED WEAPON 
STORING A FIREARM IN A CARELESS MANNER 
Regina v. Boyer, County Court of Westminster , 
New Westminster Registry X015408 
Police had reason to believe the accused was growing marihuana in his 
home. Conversations with a neighbour confirmed their beliefs. The 
constable who had talked to the neighbour went into the accused's 
backyard and what he saw in the greenhouse changed his reasons for 
believing into knowledge that the narcotic was cultivated on the 
premises. 
The constable then went to the back door which was open. There was a 
radio playing inside but no one answered his knocking and calling. 
He then entered the house and the Court added immediately in summing 
up the facts: "This was an unlawful entry". 
The constable found more inculpatory evidence once inside such as 
vials containing hashish, marihuana, handguns, etc.. By this time 
other officers had joined the constable inside the house. When they 
saw what they had, one of them phoned the police station from inside 
the house and arranged for a search warrant to be obtained under s. 10 
of the Narcotics Control Act. As a result of that warrant several 
handguns (nearly all of them loaded) were seized as well as a sawed 
off rifle found hidden under a blanket (a prohibited weapon). Conse-
quently the accused was convicted in Provincial Court with the posses-
sion of a prohibited weapon and secondly with careless storing of a 
firearm and ammunition. Representing himself, the accused appealed 
these convictions and argued that the evidence was obtained by means 
of an unreasonable search and hence inadmissible in evidence. He had 
not raised this argument before the trial judge. 
The County Court Judge, who heard this appeal, found without hesita-
tion that the officers had flagrantly violated the rights of the 
accused. They could have done everything legally by means of a search 
warrant after the conversation with the neighbour or even the 
questionable peek in the greenhouse. The Judge was very attracted to 
follow the letter of the "Therens* decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. The violation was flagrant and admitting the evidence would 
convey to police that such infringements could be committed with 
impunity. However, the B. C. Court of Appeal's interpretation of the 
Therens judgement in the Gladstone case, was binding on him. He was 
* See page 1 of Solume 21 of this publication. Also 18 c.c.c. (3d) 
481. 
** See page 22 of Volume 22 of this publication. 
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compelled to consider circumstances, the gravity of the offence, and 
whether admission of the evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
The Judge held that the charge in respect to the prohibited weapon was 
one of considerable gravity. Weapons like that are used for unlawful 
purposes such as armed robberies, he reasoned. Despite the fact that 
the Charter had been breached flagrantly by police, the serious 
offence the accused committed cannot be ignored. Therefore, following 
the instructions to the B. C. Judiciary in the Gladstone decision, the 
Judge held that the administration of justice would not be brought 
into disrepute by admitting the evidence. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Convictions upheld. 
* * * * * 
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LEGAL TIDBITS 
Typographical Error in Certificate of Analysis 
To prove the accused's blood alcohol content the Crown adduced in evidence 
a certificate that showed that the two samples of breath . police analyzed 
were taken precisely one year and twenty minutes apart. This was due to a 
typographical error in regards to the date of the first sample. It said 
1984 while it should have been 1985. The defence, of course, argued that 
the certificate did not comply with the provisions of the Criminal Code and 
could therefore not serve to prove the alcohol level at the time of driv-
ing. This is not the first time that something like this has happened and 
one provincial court of appeal concluded that the error was amendable while 
another held it was not. Our B. C. Court of Appeal held in 1983 that if a 
certificate is admissible then the defect can be corrected by oral evi-
dence. For a certificate to be admissible it must record all requirements 
summed up in s. 237(l)(f) C.C. This certificate was in compliance with 
those requirements and therefore admissible. The error had been corrected 
by · the oral evidence of the police officer and therefore the Crown had 
proved the blood alcohol level of the accused within two hours of him 
driving his car. The Vancouver County Court Judge did dismiss the 
accused's appeal and upheld his conviction of "over 80 mlg.". 
Regina v. Dagg, No. CC851480 Vancouver, January 1986. 
* * * * * 
When Does A Motorist Have to Stop for Police 
Police attempted to stop the accused for a traffic violation. When lights 
and siren were activated a high speed chase started which lasted over one-
half hour. Over forty kilometers frolll where it all started, the accused 
semi-rolled his car off the road. Consequently he was convicted of danger-
ous driving and failing "to come to a safe stop" when a peace officer 
pursued him in order to require him to stop (s. 92.1(1) M.V.A.). The 
conviction for the latter conviction was appealed. The accused argued that 
the section compels him to come to a stop but does not say "promptly" or 
"immediately". In other words it does not say when he was supposed to 
stop. He had stopped ••• after 40 km. later. 
The County Court of_ Prince Rupert di_d not buy the accused's argument. It 
held that the trial judge's manner of interpretation of the section "best 
harmonizes with the context ••• which promotes the fullest manner the policy 
and objects of the legislators". Needless to say that a safe stop at what-
ever point in time after having been signalled to stop would render the 
section meaningless. 
Regina v. Morris, Smithers Registry 4998, January 1986 
* * * * * 
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The Charter and Road Blocks 
We learned from the Dedman case* (decided by the Supreme Court of Canada) 
that a random road block by police to ferret out drinking drivers is within 
the common law ambit of police and does not offend the Charter. 
In Manitoba, two officers stopped all cars near a border crossing to 
prevent "after hours border crossings and to apprehend impaired drivers". 
The accused who was convicted of "over 80 mlg." after getting caught in 
that road block, argued that his rights to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure and arbitrary detention were infringed. Consequently 
the certificate of analysis must be excluded, he claimed. The Manitoba 
Court of Appeal agreed and acquitted him. Two of the three Manitoba 
Justices said that in Dedman's case the roadblock was part of a well adver-
tised community program. In this case there was no such program or 
announcement. That made the case distinct from the Dedman case said the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal. It concluded: 
"Much as one deplores the incidence of impaired driving, it is 
not acceptable to pe~mit law enforcement officers to make 
routine spot checks unannounced and at will". 
Regina v. Neufeld 22 C.C.C. (3d) 65, September 1985. 
* * * * * 
Self Crimination 
Here are some interesting interpretations by the Supreme Court of Canada of 
s. 13 of the Charter which reads: 
"A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not 
to have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate 
that witness in any other proceedings except in a prosecution 
for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence." 
1. This section applies to all witnesses, voluntary (accused) and 
involuntary ones; · 
2. A retrial is included in the meaning of "any other proceedings"; and 
3. In the case of a retrial (new trial ordered upon appeal) and the 
accused testified at the first trial, his evidence may no longer be 
read into the record at his second trial, even if the first trial was 
held in pre-Charter days; 
4. All evidence (including exculpatory evidence) the Crown tenders in 
support of its allegation is incriminating evidence. 
Dubois and The Queen, November 1985. 
* 
* * * * * 
R. v. Dedman, page 17, Volume 22 of this publication. 
c.c.c. (3d) 97 . 
Also 20 
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Indecent Exposure from Front Porch of Home 
The applicable portions of s. 169 c.c. reads: 
"Everyone who wilfully does an indecent act 
(a) in a public place in the presence of one or more persons 
or 
(b) in any place, with intent thereby to insult or offend any 
person, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary 
conviction." 
The accused stood on his open front porch and exposed himself indecently to 
members of the public on the street in front of his home. Consequently the 
accused was charged under subsection (a). The Crown argued that since what 
the accused did was visible from a public place the act was done in a 
public place. Not so, said the Manitoba Court of Appeal, the law specifi-
cally creates for an offence in a "public place" and "any place". Parlia-
ment provided that in circumstances such as these that there is no of fence 
unless there is an intent to insult or offend someone . 
Regina v. Buhay, 23 c.c.c. (3d) 8. 
* * * * * 
Is Erroneous Legal Advice a Reasonable Excuse? 
The accused appealed his conviction of refusing to blow. The matter of a 
"reasonable excuse" by reason of professional legal advice was explored. 
Some interesting cases were reviewed by the Vancouver County Court Judge. 
For instance in Ontario a newspaper had published a report on how the local 
provincial court judge had declared the breathalyzer laws (particularly the 
part where a citizen is compelled to give samples of his breath) unconsti-
tutional. A Mr. Macintyre who read the article had on the basis of the 
knowledge he gleaned from the article refused to blow. He nearly had 
defied the law for patriotic reasons. The provincial court judge was 
overruled and-the Ontario Court of Appeal held that Mr. Macintyre had no 
reasonable excuse to fail to blow. 
In another case (like in this one) the suspected impaired driver was 
advised by his lawyer not to give a sample of his breath. Mr. Giroux of 
Quebec took that matter to the Superior Court of that province. The 
Justice of that Court reiterated the lawyers' role in these matters, which 
results in the dictum that erroneous legal advice cannot serve as a 
defence. Lawyers are not "law declaring officials"; it is not their 
function to authoritatively interpret the law. If this was not so, the 
advice one would receive from professional legal counsel would supercede 
the Courts' interpretation of the law. It would simply mean that the 
Court's function could be usurped by giving erroneous advice . 
R. v. Baldwin, CC851721, February 1986 
* * * * * 
